U.S. survey respondents' views on distributive justice are shown to differ in two specific, related ways from what is conventionally assumed in modern optimal tax research. A large share of respondents, and in some cases a large majority, resist the full equalization of inequality due to brute luck that standard analyses would recommend. Related, a similar share prefer a classical benefit-based logic for the assignment of taxes over the conventional logic of diminishing marginal social welfare. Moreover, these two views are linked: respondents who more strongly resist equalization are more likely to prefer the classical benefit-based principle. Together, these results suggest that a large share of the American public views the allocation of pre-tax incomes as relevant to optimal tax policy and-at least in part-justly deserved unless proven otherwise, judgments that are inconsistent with standard welfarist objectives.
Introduction
According to novel survey evidence presented in this paper, the U.S. public's views on distributive justice are at odds with key features of the normative view typically applied in modern optimal tax research. This evidence suggests that the conventional approach is likely to disappoint tax scholars, advisors, and policymakers who want their theoretical frameworks and recommended tax reforms to be consistent with the public's underlying policy preferences. The results of this analysis can be organized into three main …ndings.
First, a large share of survey respondents resist full equalization of after-tax incomes even when conventional optimal tax analyses would strongly recommend it. In a hypothetical situation meant to mimic the tax policy problem, between 50% and 95% of respondents choose not to fully o¤set inequality due to brute luck even when there are neither e¢ ciency costs of redistribution nor di¤erences in desert across individuals. These choices suggest that the two reasons why conventional optimal tax analyses tolerate after-tax inequality-the importance of encouraging e¤ort and the possibility that some people "choose" to have low incomes-are not the only reasons why survey respondents, and perhaps Americans in general, accept it.
The second …nding o¤ers an explanation of the …rst: a large share of survey respondents prefer an alternative logic for taxation than that which is typically used in optimal tax analyses. The conventional logic stems from the use of a social welfare function that exhibits diminishing marginal social welfare of income. When presented with two possible justi…cations for their choices in the tax problem, between 62% and 79% of respondents prefer, instead of this logic, one tied to a centuriesold idea that Richard Musgrave (1959) named classical bene…t-based taxation (CBBT). Under CBBT, taxes are assigned based on the bene…t a taxpayer obtains from the activities of the state, with bene…t being measured by the state's role in increasing the taxpayer's economic opportunities.
In addition to being Adam Smith's …rst maxim of taxation, CBBT has a long history in public debate over taxes in the United States, from its use as a justi…cation for the new personal income tax in 1913 to its use by presidents Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Barack Obama to advocate for progressivity. In that context, …nding support for CBBT among the American public is natural, despite its absence from modern optimal tax theory.
The third …nding of this paper is that the …rst two are linked, in that those respondents more willing to accept inequality due to brute luck are signi…cantly more likely to prefer CBBT as an optimal tax principle. In other words, a large share of respondents appear to support-at least in part-the ideas that individuals are entitled to pre-tax incomes and that taxes ought to respect that entitlement. Advocates of bene…t-based taxation stress exactly these ideas when asserting its normative appeal as a voluntary rather than coercive system, in that under bene…t-based taxation a taxpayer funds social goods only to the extent that he or she bene…ts from them, paralleling the case of voluntary exchange in private markets.
These results therefore speak to a conceptual debate within optimal tax theory, and political philosophy, over whether pre-tax incomes have any moral signi…cance for policy design. As formalized …rst by James Mirrlees (1971) , modern optimal tax research typically adopts an objective put forth by John Harsanyi (1953 Harsanyi ( , 1955 ; namely, to maximize a social welfare function that depends only on individual utility levels. Though such a consequentalist objective can in principle accommodate a wide range of judgments, almost all applications of it embrace what Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel (2002) deem "the right way, investigating outcomes rather than the distribution of [tax] burdens." Under the standard approach, therefore, pre-tax incomes and taxes paid have no e¤ect on welfare or relevance to optimal policy. In contrast, a large majority of respondents to this paper's survey support CBBT, a principle that ignores after-tax incomes (i.e., "outcomes") and
de…nes optimality in terms of the relationship between pre-tax incomes and taxes paid.
It is important to clarify up front that the results of this paper are entirely consistent with there being some role for other principles in Americans'appraisals of tax policy. In fact, nearly two-thirds of the respondents to this paper's survey say they agree to some extent with the conventional logic for assigning taxes as well as with CBBT, echoing a large body of work across a range of …elds that has shown it is common for individuals to use a mixture of criteria to make policy judgments.
This paper is best seen as providing further support for the idea that models of optimal policy seeking to capture prevailing public priorities ought to use an objective characterized by normative diversity in general and that include the principle of CBBT in particular. In Weinzierl (2014 Weinzierl ( , 2015 , I formally develop mixed normative objectives and emphasize their consistency with the most general objectives assumed in modern optimal tax theory (i.e., in the work of Joseph Stiglitz (1987) and Iván Werning (2007) , among others).
In addition, to prevent confusion it is worth emphasizing that this paper is intended not to defend CBBT as a normative criterion but rather to establish and understand the roots of CBBT's importance as a positive matter. As I have discussed elsewhere (Weinzierl 2016) , because CBBT addresses a number of the most powerful normative critiques of narrower versions of bene…t-based theory and enjoys such a prominent place in public reasoning over taxes, it may merit further study from a normative perspective, but that is not the purpose of this paper. 1 This paper is closely related to a voluminous modern literature in political philosophy on the role of luck in economic outcomes, especially the so-called brute luck that is not the result of an individual voluntarily accepting risk. The in ‡uential "luck egalitarian" approach of, for example, G.A. Cohen (2011) , closely resembles the normative perspective assumed by most of the recent work in optimal tax theory. That is, the objective function in modern tax theory is typically speci…ed such that inequalities in outcomes across individuals due to factors for which individuals do not have responsibility are to be o¤set, while inequalities for which individuals are responsible are not to be o¤set (see Fleurbaey and Maniquet 2006, Lockwood and Weinzierl 2015) . 2 This paper's survey 1 How to respond to the public's normative reasoning is explored in the literature on re ‡ective equilibrium, such as in Norman Daniels (1996) . 2 "Choice" is of course a complicated concept, but in optimal tax theory it is usually represented through heterogeneity in utility functions. So, a person who puts a lower value on leisure may "choose" to work more than others. To some luck egalitarians, including perhaps Cohen, such preference di¤erences ought to be o¤set. But to others, these preferences are qualitatively (and morally) distinct from what optimal tax theorists call "ability," the capability of an individual to produce output. Ability is treated as brute luck in optimal tax models (though recent work on human capital, such as Stantcheva 2016, complicates this assumption). evidence suggests that most members of the American public have not yet converted fully to luck egalitarianism. Instead, they appear to have at least some a¢ nity for the (very di¤erent) views of Nozick (1974) that "Whether or not people's natural assets are arbitrary from a moral point of view, they are entitled to them, and to what ‡ows from them." 3 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes the survey and the …rst main …nding: resistance to full equalization of inequality due to brute luck. Section 2 introduces CBBT and then discusses the survey's second main …nding: support for CBBT as a principle of taxation. Section 3 shows that the …rst two …ndings are linked and comments on their interpretation. I refer to related research as results are presented. Section 4 concludes. In the Appendix, I provide brief formal statements of the standard optimal tax model and a CBBT modi…cation to it for reference.
Resistance to full equalization of inequality due to brute luck
First, a note on the survey behind this paper's evidence, which I have reproduced in full in the Appendix. I listed the survey on Amazon's Mechanical Turk (M-Turk) interface 4 in six rounds during late 2015 and early 2016. Nearly 2500 respondents were paid $3.00 to complete the survey, which took approximately ten minutes. The main …ndings correspond to a small set of questions from the survey that I will describe below. In addition to those questions, respondents self-reported a set of demographic traits, completed a short arithmetic quiz, and answered a series of questions designed to measure their general political opinions. I discuss the relationship of the main results to these questions below, as well.
Main result: acceptance of inequality due to luck
After respondents start the survey by entering their M-Turk ID number and agreeing to the terms of the survey, they see the following screen: Figure 1 : A scenario designed to mimic the tax policy problem.
The respondents'task is to enter an amount for "Person A pays" in the …rst text box. The amounts for "Person B pays," "Person A ends up with," and "Person B ends up with" …ll in automatically.
This hypothetical situation is designed to capture the essential elements of the tax policy problem for society. 5 In it, Person A and Person B have the chance to collectively invest in a project that yields a surplus of total output over total input. Those persons di¤er, due to brute luck they cannot avoid, in the share of the output they will receive if the project is undertaken and in what they will receive if it is not. The survey respondent's task is to assign to each person an amount to contribute to the project, where the contribution by either person may exceed the total cost of the project if the respondent wishes to provide a net transfer to the other person.
Thus, the main functions for the contributions by Person A and Person B are those of taxes in the real world: to fund socially productive activity and to determine the distribution of total surplus (output) across individuals, as in Musgrave's (1959) famous delineation of the allocation and distribution branches of government. The respondent is not included in the situation directly, so he or she is implicitly put into the position of the disinterested observer or social planner. Importantly, however, this situation is also designed to neutralize two factors that complicate the tax policy problem in reality. First, the allocations to Person A and Person B are entirely due to luck, while the relative importance of luck and tastes in determining incomes-i.e., the role of "desert"-has inspired a long-standing and heated debate in both scholarly and public discussions of tax policy. Second, there is no e¤ort exerted in this scenario, so there are no e¢ ciency costs from redistribution. In the jargon of modern optimal tax theory, this scenario has one dimension of exogenous heterogeneity and inelastic labor supply. 6 Given this design, the optimal allocation according to the standard optimal tax objective (i.e., a social welfare function that is concave in income) is clear: full equalization. That is, Person A should pay $24,000, Person B should receive a transfer of $6,000, and each should end up with $36,000. With no preference heterogeneity and a concave social welfare function, equal after-tax incomes maximize welfare for a given amount of resources, and with inelastic e¤ort the amount of resources is …xed.
Respondents are less egalitarian. Figure 1 shows the 2,037 responses to versions of this question for which the answer to "Person A pays $_" falls between $9,000 and $24,000. 7 The mean is $16,772 with a standard deviation of $5,267. The modal response is the cost of the o¤er-$18,000-the choice under which payments are maximally progressive without providing a net transfer to Person B. The most striking result from this question is that a large majority of respondents-more than 75%-stop short of full equalization of the net proceeds from the project even though redistribution 6 In the notation of the model in the Appendix, these simpli…cations amount to assuming all individuals have the same and the incentive constraints are ignored in the tax authority's optimization. 7 I omit the 197 respondents who have Person A pay less than Person B or more than $24,000. Another 219 respondents to an early round were not asked a similar question. is nondistortionary and the gross proceeds are explicitly determined by luck. This result suggests that the two reasons emphasized in conventional optimal tax analyses for allowing inequality in after-tax incomes are unsatisfying as explanations for American skepticism toward redistribution.
A substantial share of respondents-42%-choose a point between full equalization of outcomes and proportional payments. A bit more than 24% choose to fully equalize the net incomes across individuals (A pays $24,000), as conventional optimal tax analyses would recommend, while 18% choose to allocate the costs of the project in proportion to each individual's gross incomes (A pays $12,000). As is shown in the Appendix, proportional payments are optimal under CBBT given the relationship (described in Figure 1 ) between the gross proceeds when the o¤er is refused and accepted.
That more than two-…fths of respondents, including the median respondent, choose progressivity but not equalization is consistent with the idea that the typical respondent feels some a¢ nity for the principles behind each of the more extreme choices. Normative diversity of that kind has been documented by a large body of previous work outside economics and a few recent works within it (see Hochschild 1981 , Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1992, Feldman and Zaller 1992, Weinzierl 2014, 2016, Saez and Stantcheva 2015) . It also appears in the second result of this paper, discussed below.
Further supporting these results are the respondents'answers when they are asked "what do you think the typical American would say is the best outcome?" in the same tax scenario. The skepticism toward redistribution that respondents attribute to the typical American is even greater than what they express themselves. 8 The mean response is only $14,735, and only 14% of respondents think that the "typical American" would choose full equalization in this situation, despite the lack of incentive costs or desert claims. 16% of respondents think the typical American would choose proportionality, while fully 29% think the typical American would split the costs of the o¤er evenly (i.e., A pays $9,000). Consistent with their own preferences, however, a substantial share of respondents (33%) think the typical American would choose an outcome between proportionality and full equalization.
Robustness across respondent traits
The survey gathers several indicators of respondents' personal traits. It asks about three demographic indicators: their age in four ranges (18-25, 26-40, 41-64, and 65+); race (white, black, or other); and gender (male, female). It also asks them to report their education level completed (some high school, high school graduate, some college, or college graduate). To obtain an estimate of their economic status, it shows them the current CBO income distribution (four lower quintiles and then four …ner-grained quantiles within the top quintile) in a column chart and asks them for their household's position in that distribution when they were 10 years old and 45 years old.
Finally, it tests respondents'numeracy with three multiple-choice arithmetic questions. Table 1 shows the mean answer (to how much Person A should pay) among the respondents by their answers to these questions. The mean overall was $16,772. The subgroup means are similar, with standard deviations within answers of approximately 5,000.
The largest gaps appear in the numeracy and age categories, with respondents who give more correct answers to the arithmetic questions and older respondents having Person A pay more.
The survey also has respondents self-report several aspects of their political opinions. It asks them to describe their political perspective on economic issues (left-leaning or liberal, centrist or moderate, right-leaning or conservative, not sure); to say whether they strongly or somewhat oppose or support libertarianism with regard to economic issues (libertarianism is not explicitly de…ned);
to say whether the government or individuals are responsible for people having their basic needs met; and to say whether they think that the "sacri…ce" from paying taxes ought to be borne more by the rich than the poor or borne equally by everyone. Table 2 show the mean answer to how much Person A should pay among the respondents who chose each answer to these political opinion questions. The di¤erences across mean answers by political opinion are somewhat larger than across personal traits. As might be expected, respondents who identify with the political right, who think individuals ought to be responsible for meeting their basic needs, and who think the sacri…ce from taxes ought to be borne equally (rather than progressively) have Person A pay substantially less.
The patterns visible in these tables are con…rmed in a simple OLS regression. The only statistically signi…cant demographic predictors are numeracy and age, with those who got all three arithmetic questions and older respondents having Person A pay more. Two of the indicators of political views-belief in individual responsibility for basic needs and support for equal sacri…ce-have signi…cant predictive power in the directions suggested by Table 2 . While statistically signi…cant, none of these variables have economically substantial e¤ects on the mean answers.
In sum, resistance to full equalization of inequality due to luck appears to be widespread across subgroups of the survey population. It also appears to be related, not surprisingly, to respondents' general views on the proper role of government and tax policy.
Robustness to variations in survey question
Here, I show how two variations to the survey question from Figure 1 provide further insight into the result just described. 9
The salience of payments versus outcomes
First, I show respondents only the payments made by each person or the amounts each person ends up with, rather than both (as in the benchmark setup). These variations help measure the extent to which elevating the salience of either aspect of the policy a¤ects respondents'moral judgments.
For example, emphasizing after-tax incomes may make respondents more likely to equalize the amounts Person A and Person B end up with. This variation thereby links directly to the question of whether the public endorses the conventional approach's assumption that only after-tax, not pre-tax, incomes ought to matter for policy.
Whether respondents are shown only the payments or only the outcomes, the main results of this section continue to hold, but these changes do have noticeable-and informative-e¤ects. In both cases, a large majority of respondents choose less than full redistribution: 95% in the paymentsonly version and 65% in the outcomes-only version. Approximately two-…fths choose an amount for Person A to pay between $12,000 and $24,000: 43% and 40% respectively. However, support for the egalitarian outcome does shift with these variations on the benchmark. In the payments-only variation, 5% of the 133 respondents choose to have A pay $24,000, while in the outcomes-only variation nearly 35% of the 120 respondents choose it (across all setups, 24% chose this outcome).
Related, proportional payments (A pays $12,000) are chosen by 27% and 8% of respondents in the two variations, compared to 18% across settings.
These results suggest that asking respondents to engage with both payments and outcomes (i.e., after-tax incomes) causes them to moderate the more extreme views they have if they consider only one or the other. For example, the mean amount Person A pays was $16,772 across all surveys, compared to $14,135 in the payments-only variation and $17,988 in the outcomes-only variation. 9 I do not discuss the e¤ects of minor wording and framing changes across the rounds of the survey that had negligible e¤ects on the results. For example, replacing "have to pay" with "pay" in the text of the scenario from Figure 1 may make the payments seem less compulsory, but that change had no noticeable e¤ect on the results.
Discrete versus continuous choices
Second, I modify the scenario in Figure 1 to provide respondents with a discrete set of choices, each of which indicates the amounts that both persons pay (or receive) and end up with. In one variation, I provide four choices: Person A pays $9,000, $12,000, $18,000, or $24,000. In a second variation, I add two additional (intermediate) choices: Person A pays $15,000 or $21,000. In a third, I add two more (extreme) choices: Person A pays $6,000 or $27,000. Across these three versions, I obtain 266 responses.
These variations are intended to address two concerns. First, respondents to the setup shown in Figure 1 may not consider the full range of possible allocations when entering the amount Person A pays in the …rst text box. For example, respondents may default to having Person A pay $18,000 because it is the cost of the project, not understanding that A could be asked to pay more than the cost so as to fund a transfer to Person B. Second, though the three text boxes …ll in automatically once the respondent chooses an amount for A to pay, the implicit mathematics behind Figure 1 's setup may be too complicated for some respondents, causing them to default to simple numbers that don't re ‡ect their true opinions, such as having A pay the precise cost of the project.
Consistent with the …rst of these concerns, these variations reduce the concentration of answers at $18,000, but contrary to the second concern they increase the shares of respondents choosing the simplest options: full equalization of after-tax incomes and equal absolute tax payments. The modal choice in these variations-chosen by just under 50% of respondents-is Person A paying $24,000, the full equalization recommended by the conventional approach's assumed normative view. The remaining respondents-just over 50%-continue to stop short of fully o¤setting Person A's luckbased advantage. In sum, these variations yield weaker versions of the overall results but leave intact the main …nding that a large share of respondents resist costless redistribution.
While the discrete choice versions of the survey clearly have advantages, these results make clear that there are countervailing considerations complicating their interpretation relative to the continuous, text-entry setup of Figure 1 . First, multiple-choice survey questions require less engagement by the respondent than text-entry questions (especially than those in which the interdependence of allocations is made clear by the amounts automatically adjusting), potentially causing respondents to choose quickly and without consideration. Second, any set of choices unavoidably introduces elements of framing, and (as the data suggest) listing the options may privilege those with "simple" features such as equal payments or equal after-tax incomes because they are easier to understand.
Interpretation
The results of this section show a robust resistance among a large share of survey respondents to equalizing outcomes even when the policy problem is unconstrained by the practical concerns of e¢ ciency and desert that typically matter in taxation. One possible explanation is that respondents may disagree with the objective assumed in conventional optimal tax analyses. The next section turns to evidence on that possibility.
Preference for CBBT as a principle of optimal taxation
I now turn to the second novel …nding of this paper: a widespread preference among survey respondents for a classical bene…t-based logic for taxation over the conventional approach's logic of diminishing marginal social welfare of income. First, however, I provide a primer on CBBT, as it and its formulation in the modern optimal tax model are not well known. The interested reader can …nd a brief formal treatment in the Appendix and a more thorough treatment, including additional analytical results and a discussion of the sharp contrast between CBBT's past prominence and its present neglect in tax scholarship, in Weinzierl (2016).
Primer on CBBT
CBBT is the combination of two ideas: taxes ought to be based on the bene…t an individual obtains from the activities of the state; and the best measure of that bene…t is how much the state's activities increase the economic opportunities (i.e., the income-earning ability) of the individual.
As mentioned in the Introduction, CBBT has played and continues plays a prominent role in American rhetoric on tax policy. An important example is the following statement by President Barack Obama, who in 2011 argued for increased progressivity of the income tax:
"As a country that values fairness, wealthier individuals have traditionally borne a greater share of this [tax] burden than the middle class or those less fortunate....it's a basic re ‡ection of our belief that those who've bene…ted most from our way of life can a¤ord to give back a little bit more." 10 Here, Obama argues that taxes ought to be based on bene…t from "our way of life," and he explicitly links that bene…t to the taxpayer's ability to pay. This combination of two classic principles of tax design (bene…t-based and ability-based) into a "bene…t-as-ability" based principle is a particularly succinct statement of CBBT. It recalls a more famous statement of it by Adam Smith (1776) as his …rst maxim of taxation: "The subjects of every state ought to contribute toward the support of the government, as near as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state."
The normative appeal of CBBT, according to its advocates, is due in part to its avoidance of coercive taxation. Of course, bene…t as de…ned here is unobservable, so that the second-best CBBT tax system will be coercive in one sense. Nevertheless, CBBT's supporters argue that there remains an essential di¤erence between the bene…t-based system and one that maximizes a consequentialist social welfare function. The goal of the former, but not the latter, is for an individual to pay an amount for the activities of the state that is determined by his or her willingness to pay (i.e., marginal rate of substitution).
For the purposes of this paper, it is important to note that optimal taxes under CBBT do not depend on the distribution of after-tax incomes. Instead, they are de…ned by the relationship between individuals' innate abilities and pre-tax incomes, in stark contrast to the conventional normative approach in optimal tax. While there exists evidence for CBBT playing a role in elite rhetoric and thinking on tax policy, no direct evidence on its appeal to the public has been gathered. I turn to that evidence next.
Survey evidence of support for CBBT
Immediately after respondents make their choices in the hypothetical tax-like situation described in Section 1, the following screen asks them to consider the reasoning behind their choices: The …rst of the two reasons refers to the logic of diminishing marginal social welfare of income applied in conventional optimal tax analyses, while the second reason refers to the CBBT principle. 11 After respondents make their choice on the question in Figure 3 , the survey asks about the strength of their opinions on both reasons. Speci…cally, respondents are asked whether they strongly disagree, disagree, agree, or strongly agree with each of the reasons in Figure 3 .
In response to this question, 71% of respondents prefer the classical bene…t-based justi…cation to the conventional one. Moreover, as Table 3 shows, nearly 70% of the 29% who prefer the conventional logic state that they either agree or strongly agree with CBBT, bringing the total share of respondents expressing support for CBBT to over 90%. In contrast, less than half of those who prefer CBBT express agreement with the conventional logic. These results suggest that, when reasoning over tax policy, Americans are more comfortable with the logic of CBBT than with the logic typically applied in modern optimal tax analyses.
Robustness to survey design
Changes to the overall survey design (as described in Section 1) and to the wording of this question generate variation around the 71% overall …gure, but the share of respondents preferring CBBT lies between 62% and 79% in all versions. The smallest share (62%) is obtained in the discrete options version described in Section 1.3.3. The largest shares are obtained in either the outcomes-only version described earlier (78%), or in a version that excludes the phrase "didn't do anything to deserve ending up" and replaces it with "ends up" in the …rst option in Figure 3 (79%). 12 Table 4 and Table 5 summarize support for CBBT across self-reported demographic traits and political views. Statistical analysis in Section 3 will largely support these simple cross-tabulations, though with some suggestive exceptions. These patterns suggest that support for CBBT is largely universal, consistent with both the substantial support it receives among those respondents who prefer the conventional logic and its use by elite political …gures in the United States.
Robustness across respondent traits

Link between results: the moral signi…cance of pre-tax income
In this section, I show that the two previous sections' …ndings are linked: that is, respondents who more strongly resist equalization of inequality due to brute luck are more likely to prefer the classical bene…t-based logic for taxation. After presenting evidence of this linkage, I discuss one potential interpretation of it that relates to the debate over whether pre-tax incomes ought to be considered morally relevant for tax design, and I address a few interpretive questions.
Visual evidence of this linkage is shown in Figure 4 , which gives the share of respondents preferring the CBBT principle for six ranges of answers to how much Person A should pay. This …gure shows a substantial decline in the share supporting CBBT as a¢ nity for redistribution rises. This pattern holds across variations of the survey questions, including in the discrete choice versions described in section 1.3.3 (where support for redistribution was greater). Table 6 presents the results of a simple regression analysis revealing that this relationship between resistance to redistribution and support for CBBT is sizeable and statistically signi…cant. Notes: The dependent variable in this probit regression is the respondent's 0-1 choice between the conventional logic (0) and the CBBT logic (1) for progressivity, as shown in Figure 4 . The mean value for the dependent variable is 0.70. A positive coe¢ cient on an explanatory variable indicates that a higher value for it is related to a higher likelihood the respondent prefers the CBBT logic for progressivity. The symbol ** denotes signi…cance at the 5% level; * at the 10% level.
Calculating marginal e¤ects for these results implies that a $1,000 decrease in "Person A pays"
is associated with an increase of 1.1 percentage points in the likelihood that the respondent prefers the CBBT logic (the mean value is 71%). Extrapolating this e¤ect across the range of values for "Person A pays" would explain more than two-thirds of the gap between the share of respondents preferring CBBT shown in Figure 4 across the range from $12,000 to $24,000.
The only other signi…cant relationship in Table 5 shows that respondents who believe the "sac-ri…ce" from paying taxes ought to be borne equally (rather than more by the rich) are more likely to support CBBT. The conceptual relationship between the principle of Equal Sacri…ce and bene…tbased taxation was hinted at in Feldstein (1976) and is discussed at greater length in Weinzierl (2016). 13 But an important aspect of this relationship is worth highlighting here: both CBBT and Equal Sacri…ce give moral weight to pretax incomes. I turn to that common feature next.
Pretax income' s moral signi…cance and the burden of proof for desert
One way to interpret the linkage between respondents'views of luck-based inequality and CBBT relates to a current debate in both optimal tax theory and political philosophy over whether pre-tax incomes are relevant to optimal tax policy. Murphy and Nagel (2002) forcefully argue that they are not: "Pretax income, in particular, has no independent moral signi…cance. It does not de…ne something to which the taxpayer has a prepolitical or natural right, and which the government expropriates from the individual in levying taxes on it."
Respondents to this paper's survey appear to disagree with Murphy and Nagel's view. A majority e¤ectively grant Person A some entitlement to a purely luck-based advantage, bestowing on pre-tax incomes a moral relevance it is denied by a conventional welfarist objective. Consistent with that position, respondents more willing to accept inequality due to luck also prefer to assign taxes based on CBBT, a principle that seeks to implement a more "voluntary" tax system and de…nes optimality in terms of the relationship between pre-tax incomes and taxes paid.
In other words, a large share of this paper's survey respondents appear to put some of the burden of proof for desert on the opposite side of where luck egalitarian political philosophers do.
For luck egalitarians, inequality due to luck is unacceptable unless proven otherwise and therefore should be o¤set. Our results suggest that most Americans, in contrast, at least partially endorse the view that inequality due to luck is acceptable unless proven otherwise and therefore not the proper object of redistribution.
Though the idea that pre-tax incomes and taxes are morally relevant to the public sharply contradicts the standard approach, this paper is part of a recent body of work …nding evidence for it. Charité, Fisman, and In fact, some moral philosophers also resist that claim that pre-tax incomes are morally irrelevant. Brennan (2005) writes: "The problem with Murphy and Nagel's argument, as I see it, is that it takes an entirely defensible claim-namely that individuals do not have an incontestable moral claim to their individual gross incomes-and replaces it with a much stronger claim-that they have no moral claim to their individual incomes at all...I think there is a middle turf. I think it's obvious that there's a middle turf." This paper's evidence suggests that a large share of Americans agree.
Interpretative questions
The results in this paper raise a number of interpretive questions. Here, I address a few of them.
First, would respondents choose di¤erently if the hypothetical situation in Figure 1 had put the unlucky person in a much worse absolute position? In particular, would respondents be more likely to make a net transfer to Person B in that case? These questions highlight an important point. If putting Person B in a state that mimics poverty were to likely yield more support for net transfers from Person A, such a result would be entirely consistent with the conclusions above. As noted, the choices of respondents, both over equalization and their preferred principle of taxation, reinforce the evidence from a wide range of sources that most people balance competing normative principles when making judgments such as these. If Person B were put in a dire position, the force of the egalitarian principles in most people's calculations would increase dramatically, so respondents having Person A pay more would not imply general support for equalization of luck.
Second, what if the resistance to equalization re ‡ects empathy with loss aversion (as in Charité, Fisman, and , so that respondents' hesitancy to take away from Person A and give to Person B can be explained with a conventional utilitarian logic? Though this possibility may seem like a challenge to this paper's conclusions, it can be seen as another way to state them. The evidence presented here shows that survey respondents are willing to grant that pre-tax incomes have some moral signi…cance and, therefore, that individuals have some justi…able claims with regard to them. This willingness means that a reshu-ing of those pre-tax incomes would change the set of claims respondents would grant to individuals. 14 Such a change seems illogical to someone convinced that what matters (from a moral perspective) are after-tax incomes-after all, how could a random reassignment of pre-tax incomes change the optimal assignment of outcomes?
But respondents are not convinced that what matters are after-tax incomes; in fact they seem to hold the view that even entirely luck-based pre-tax incomes are reasonable starting points for the determination of taxes (after all, they endorse CBBT as a principle of tax design). So long as respondents view pre-tax incomes as meaningful, explaining their responses as re ‡ecting empathy with loss aversion is simply one way of describing the judgments this paper's results highlight.
Third, how are these results consistent with the value most individuals evidently place on insurance? After all, one of the most familiar justi…cations for tax policy that o¤sets innate inequality is that it provides insurance for otherwise uninsurable risk. The debate in political philosophy over this argument is vast, but for the purposes of this paper the important point is that most survey respondents appear to be at least somewhat hesitant to embrace the insurance analogy when it comes to risk at the "starting point," contrary to the arguments not only of Harsanyi but also, famously, of John Rawls (1971) . Instead, they appear to treat such risk, even though it is clearly "brute luck" and therefore outside the control of individuals, as just or at least not unjust, consistent with the counterarguments of Nozick (1974).
Conclusion
The main contribution of this paper is to present new survey evidence of ways in which a large share of Americans-arguably a majority-are ambivalent toward key features of the normative framework that has been generally adopted by modern optimal tax analyses. To the extent that these …ndings indicate sincere normative diversity in most people's attitudes toward distributive justice, and to the extent that optimal tax theorists want their models to be consonant with public priorities for taxation, researchers ought to consider capturing that ambivalence in their work, as well.
These results raise many questions that will require substantial time and further study to answer. Do respondents' answer re ‡ect their considered preferences or their gut reactions that would change if they gave more time to the questions? Would "education" in these issues change their preferences? Do respondents'stated preferences for these hypothetical scenarios translate into votes for speci…c policies and policymakers? Exploring these questions will further improve our understanding of popular reasoning on distributive justice.
Appendix
Conventional optimal tax model
The standard modern optimal tax model, modi…ed to allow for preference heterogeneity, has the following structure. 15 A population of individuals di¤er in two unobservable ways, income-earning ability w 0, and preferences for leisure 0, jointly distributed according to the density f (w; ). Each individual has utility of after-tax income c and pre-tax income y that depends on the product of w and according to the utility function u (c; y; w ) :
A tax authority speci…es bundles of pre-tax and after-tax income to maximize a function of individual utilities. The authority's normative judgments may depend on w and , not just the product w . The objective is:
where G ( ) is assumed to be an increasing and concave function of utility. The tax authority faces a feasibility constraint:
and incentive compatibility (IC) constraints that guarantee individuals choose labor supply optimally:
U (c(w ); y(w ); w ) U (c(w 0 0 ); y(w 0 0 ); w ); 8w; w 0 ; ; 0 :
To solve for the optimal tax policy, (1) is maximized subject to (2) and (3).
CBBT optimal tax model
To solidify ideas, it may help to show how CBBT can be represented within the apparatus of modern tax theory. As in the standard setup, suppose a social planner chooses taxes and the level of public spending. Individuals are di¤erentiated by ability w, indexed with i, and derive utility according to
where c i is private consumption for individual i and y i is i's income, so that y i w i is work e¤ort. Individuals take the tax system as given and maximize their own utility, yielding equilibrium consumption and income allocations fc i ; y i g I i=1 and utility levels U i . To capture CBBT in this setup requires two novel steps. First, we make individuals' heterogeneous income-earning abilities endogenous functions of both endowed ability and public goods spending. Formally, w i = f (a i ; G) ; where i 2 I now indexes endowed ability types a i , G 0 is the level of spending on public goods, and f ( ) is a di¤erentiable ability production function.
Second, we apply the method of Lindahl (1919) to determine the …rst-best optimal allocation under CBBT. That method has us consider a hypothetical scenario in which each individual i is assigned a share of total taxes to be paid, i , and then allowed to choose the level of public goods provision that maximize her utility subject to her personal budget constraint taking i as given.
Lindahl de…ned optimal policy as that in which two conditions are satis…ed: …rst, the personalized shares cause each type to prefer the same quantity of public goods 16 ; second, the cost of the public goods is fully covered by tax payments. I call the allocation that satis…es these conditions a First-Best Lindahl Equilibrium.
The feature of the resulting allocation most relevant to this paper is the taxes paid by each individual. To characterize those taxes, I …rst de…ne a key elasticity term:
De…nition 1 De…ne the Hicksian partial elasticity of complementarity between public goods and endowed ability, G;a i , as:
G;a i = f G;a (a i ; G) f (a i ; G) f G (a i ; G) f a (a i ; G) ;
at a given G.
The Hicksian partial elasticity of complementarity captures the degree to which public goods and endowed ability magnify each other in determining income-earning ability. If G;a i 0; endowed ability and public goods are not complements in the production of income-earning ability. If G;a i 2 (0; 1) the elasticity of income-earning ability with respect to the level of public goods spending is positive but decreasing in endowed ability; if G;a i > 1, the elasticity of income-earning ability with respect to the level of public goods spending is increasing in endowed ability.
As shown formally in Weinzierl (2016) , this elasticity of complementarity determines the progressivity of tax rates under CBBT. If G;a i > 1, so that those high in endowed ability bene…t more than proportionally from the activities of the state, average tax rates are progressive (i.e., they increase in endowed ability). If G;a i < 1 taxes are regressive, and if G;a i = 1 taxes are proportional to income. This last case, which Smith (1776) appears to endorse, obtains if we assume a multiplicative form for the ability production function, i.e., f (a i ; G) = h (a i ) g (G) for some functions h (a i ) ; g (G). In that case, the ‡at tax rate on income equals the elasticity of income-earning ability with respect to public goods spending. For example, if g (G) = g for some > 0; then the CBBT-optimal tax policy is a uniform tax rate of : Note that the setup of the scenario in Figure   1 implies that the ability production function f (a i ; G ) takes this multiplicative form. 1 6 It is this step that lends, according to bene…t-based taxation's advocates, such a system a claim to being voluntary rather than coercive. Of course, bene…t is unobservable, so that the second-best CBBT tax system will be coercive in a sense. Nevertheless, there remains an essential di¤erence between the bene…t-based system and, for example, a utilitarian one. In the …rst-best allocation of the former but not the latter, an individual pays a "price" for the activities of the state that is determined by his or her willingness to pay (i.e., marginal rate of substitution).
